The impact of audit quality on the pricing of fair value estimates in the banking industry by Chen, Bingyi
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2016
The impact of audit quality on the
pricing of fair value estimates in
the banking industry
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/36683
Boston University
  
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 
QUESTROM SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF AUDIT QUALITY ON THE PRICING OF 
 
FAIR VALUE ESTIMATES IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
BINGYI CHEN 
 
B.A., University of Manchester, 2006 
M.S., University of Oxford, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2016 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 © 2016 by 
  BINGYI CHEN 
  All rights reserved 
  
Approved by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Reader _______________________________________________________ 
 Krishnagopal Menon, Ph.D. 
 Professor of Accounting 
 Everett W. Lord Distinguished Faculty Scholar 
 
 
 
 
Second Reader _______________________________________________________ 
 Edward Riedl, Ph.D. 
 Professor of Accounting 
 Everett W. Lord Distinguished Faculty Scholar 
 
 
 
 
Third Reader _______________________________________________________ 
 Ana Albuquerque, Ph.D. 
 Associate Professor of Accounting 
 
 
 
 
Fourth Reader _______________________________________________________ 
 Andrea Buffa, Ph.D. 
 Assistant Professor of Finance 
 
  iv
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
I would like to dedicate this work to my family for their love,  
understanding and support during my doctoral studies. 
  
  v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It is my pleasure to thank everyone who helped make this work possible. I owe 
my deepest gratitude to my Ph.D. advisor, Krish Menon, for his insights, guidance, and 
encouragement throughout my doctoral studies. I am really grateful to have you as my 
mentor to guide me along this journey. I am also very thankful to my dissertation 
committee members: Ana Albuquerque, Andrea Buffa, and Eddie Riedl, for making time 
for me, challenging me over and over again, and supporting me for the past years. 
I would like to thank Joshua Anderson, Francois Brochet, Alison Kirby Jones, 
Lynn Li, Kumar Sivakumar, Michael Smith, Estelle Sun and workshop participants at 
Boston University for their helpful comments on various drafts of this work. I also thank 
my friends and classmates who have helped me grow and develop over the past few years. 
A special thanks goes to Jenelle Conaway for reading my writings and offering me 
suggestions. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my wonderful parents for all they have 
done for me throughout my life. To my husband, Song, who saw me through this entire 
journey, and showed unconditional support and boundless confidence in me. To our son, 
Ryan, who came into our lives during my doctoral studies, you have made me stronger, 
better and more fulfilled than I could ever imagined. 
  
  vi
THE IMPACT OF AUDIT QUALITY ON THE PRICING OF 
FAIR VALUE ESTIMATES IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
BINGYI CHEN 
Boston University Questrom School of Business, 2016 
 
Major Professor: Krishnagopal Menon, Ph.D., Professor of Accounting, 
 Everett W. Lord Distinguished Faculty Scholar 
 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) 
inspections have frequently reported audit deficiencies related to fair value 
measurements. Motivated by PCAOB’s concern, this paper examines investors’ 
perceptions on audit quality of fair value measurements. Using a sample of U.S. public 
banks from 2008 through 2013, I document a significant positive (negative) association 
between stock prices (bid-ask spreads) and audit quality of fair value measurements. This 
finding indicates that audit quality adds incremental value to investors as it mitigates 
reliability concerns relating to fair value estimates. Furthermore, using the fair value 
hierarchy mandated by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 157, I find 
the audit quality effect is stronger for Level 3 fair value estimates; suggesting high audit 
quality mitigates the reliability concerns relating to the substantial estimation 
uncertainties and management bias inherent in the more opaque Level 3 financial assets. 
Additional cross-sectional evidence shows that the effect of audit quality on the pricing 
of fair value estimates is greater for smaller banks and banks with a declining regulatory 
capital. 
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) INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) 
inspections have frequently reported audit deficiencies related to fair value 
measurements.1 According to a 2014 survey of PCAOB inspection reports from the top 
25 U.S. accounting firms during 2008 to 2012, 51 out of 80 available reports (64%) 
indicate fair value related deficiencies. 2   Moreover, fair value related deficiencies 
constitute 25% of total audit deficiencies in 2012 (Acuitas, 2014). In particular, PCAOB 
has identified that auditors do not perform adequate substantive tests to understand the 
underlying inputs and models used by management, are not sufficiently skeptical of 
management’s fair value judgments, and fail to identify and test controls over fair value 
hierarchy disclosure (PCAOB, 2013). These concerns of the PCAOB call into question 
whether auditors effectively perform their roles in providing reliable assurance over fair 
value estimates.  
Fair value accounting arguably provides the most relevant information to 
investors in their valuation decisions as it better reflects the current market value of a 
firm’s assets and liabilities. The increase in relevance, however, comes at the cost of 
reliability, as fair value measurements often require more subjective judgments in 
preparing financial information. Fair value measurements involve managers not only 
providing assumptions and estimates, but also choosing among valuation methods. The 
measurement attributes and degree of discretion that underlie fair value estimates make it 
                                                 
1 I use the term “fair value measurements” and “fair value estimates” interchangeably throughout 
the paper. 
2 The PCAOB annually inspects accounting firms that audit more than JKK public companies. 
Firms that audit fewer public companies are inspected at least once every three years. 
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a likely area in which investors have high uncertainty about its reliability (e.g. 
Richardson et al., 2005; Lev et al., 2010).  
In 2007, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) adopted FAS 157, 
Fair Value Measurements, to establish a hierarchy of fair value measurements across 
three levels based on the source of inputs.3 In particular, Level 1 inputs are observable 
from quoted prices in active markets. Level 2 inputs are indirectly observable from 
similar items in active markets, and Level 3 inputs are unobservable and internally 
developed by the entity. In a recent review paper, Bratten et al. (2013) suggest that the 
subjectivity of unobservable Level 3 inputs likely induces measurement uncertainty, 
therefore Level 3 fair value estimates are associated with increased concerns over 
reliability. Consistent with this prediction, studies have shown that reliability concerns 
over Level 3 fair value measurements are associated with less value relevance (Kolev, 
2008; Song et al., 2010), greater information risk (Riedl and Serafeim, 2011), and 
increased audit fees (Ettredge et al. 2010). 
In addition to financial statement users, auditors also experience significant 
difficulties when auditing high uncertainty fair value estimates (e.g. Bell and Griffin, 
2012; Bratten et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2012). In a paper discussing implementation 
issues with FAS 157, Benston (2008) shows that complex fair value estimates can be 
easily manipulated by managers and are hard to verify by auditors. Additionally, Bratten 
et al. (2013) discuss possible sources for observed fair value related audit deficiencies, 
                                                 
3 For financial reporting periods subsequent to September JL, MKKN, the FASB implemented the 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC). The provisions of FAS JLO are incorporated into the 
Codification as ASC PMK, Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures. 
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including environmental factors such as macroeconomic fluctuations, task factors such as 
ambiguity in fair value reporting guidance, and auditor-specific factors such as lack of 
valuation knowledge and professional skepticism. Finally, Cannon and Bedard (2015) 
also note that auditors are more likely to allow biased reporting in the presence of 
estimation uncertainty. Collectively, both the prior studies and the PCAOB’s inspection 
reports indicate that auditors face significant challenges and risks in auditing fair value 
estimates, suggesting differential audit quality may be observed in this area. 
Audit quality can have a differential effect on the reliability of fair value 
measurements for two reasons. First, high-quality auditors have better monitoring ability, 
competent knowledge and specialized skills in auditing the complex fair value models 
and inputs. Second, high-quality auditors have greater reputation and litigation incentive 
to deter managers’ opportunistic bias. Therefore, investors may rely on high-quality 
auditors to reduce valuation uncertainties associated with fair value estimates. For this 
reason, in this study I investigate the effect of audit quality in mitigating investors’ 
reliability concerns over fair value estimates.  
Although the challenges surrounding fair value auditing have been documented in 
PCAOB inspection reports and academic surveys (e.g. Bell and Griffin, 2012), investors’ 
perceptions of fair value auditing have not been analyzed in an archival setting. Using the 
fair value disclosures reported by U.S. financial institutions under FAS 157, I examine 
the association between audit quality (proxied by Big 4 auditors and banking specialist 
auditors) and investors’ pricing of fair value measurements (proxied by share prices and 
bid-ask spreads). Following the value relevance literature, I first estimate the association 
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between share prices and audit quality of banks’ fair value assets. I further explore the 
impact of audit quality on a bank’s information risk associated with fair value 
measurements. Following the risk relevance literature, I examine the association between 
bid-ask spreads and audit quality of banks’ fair value assets. I find that high-quality 
audits are positively associated with the value relevance- and negatively associated with 
the information risk- of fair value estimates. Overall, my results show that investors place 
incremental value on audit quality in their pricing of banks’ fair value assets, suggesting 
that high-quality audits have a mitigating effect on concerns over fair value 
measurements. 
Additionally, I predict that the effect of audit quality is stronger for Level 3 fair 
value measurements. Because investors’ reliability concerns are likely higher for opaque 
Level 3 fair value measurements that are not observable in the market, than for Level 1 
and 2 (Song et al. 2010; Riedl and Serafeim, 2011). In the second hypothesis, I examine 
whether the effect of audit quality varies across the three levels of FAS 157 fair value 
hierarchy, and find that the audit quality impact is significantly stronger for Level 3 than 
for Level 1 and Level 2 fair value assets. 
I further investigate the cross-sectional variation in the effect of audit quality on 
investors’ pricing of fair value estimates. First, I examine whether the impact of audit 
quality is stronger for smaller banks, as prior studies show that accounting information of 
small banks is less transparent than large banks (Lang and Lundholm, 1993), therefore 
investors’ reliability concerns are higher with smaller banks. My results indicate that 
investors value high-quality audits performed by Big 4 auditors more for small banks 
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than for large banks.  
As a second cross-sectional test, I examine whether the impact of audit quality is 
stronger for banks with a declining capital adequacy, where capital adequacy is measured 
using a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio. Bank regulators view capital adequacy as a key 
indicator of banks’ financial health (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Banks with a declining Tier 
1 capital ratio might have regulatory reporting incentives as well as stock market 
incentives to report fair value estimates opportunistically. Accordingly, I expect investors 
of banks with decreased Tier 1 capital ratio to have higher reliability concerns, and 
therefore, I predict audit quality will have a greater impact for those banks. Consistent 
with this prediction, I find that those banks with reduced regulatory capital exhibit 
stronger audit quality effect. 
Moreover, these results are robust across a wide array of sensitivity tests, 
including: controlling for potential endogeneity of auditor choice using the Heckman’s 
two-stage model; a size-matched sample to control for differences across sizes in Big 4 
and non-Big 4 banks; and excluding any potential financial crisis effect on the pricing of 
fair value estimates.  
Finally, I note the banks that were considered to have high audit quality are less 
likely to receive SEC comment letters on fair value measurements, providing evidence 
that the perceived audit quality measures are capturing the actual quality of fair value 
auditing. I also extend my analysis using quarterly data and find that the audit quality 
effect is stronger in the fourth quarter than in the first three quarters, suggesting the 
incremental effect of fourth quarter auditing relative to interim quarters reviewing. 
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My study makes several contributions. First, I extend the literature on factors that 
influence investors’ perceptions towards fair value measurements. Prior studies find the 
relevance and reliability of fair value measurements are positively associated with the 
presence of external appraisers (Dietrich et al, 2001; Muller and Riedl, 2002), the 
strength of corporate governance (Song et al., 2010), and the quality of ex-ante 
information environment (Riedl and Serafeim, 2011). In this study, I show the presence 
of high-quality external auditors is another factor that can mitigate investors’ reliability 
concerns regarding fair value estimates. Second, by documenting this association, my 
study adds to the literature on the economic consequences of auditing in capital markets 
(e.g. Teoh and Wong, 1993; Behn et al., 2008). Third, this study also contributes to our 
understanding of audit quality in the banking industry. Since studies of audit quality 
routinely exclude financial companies, we know surprisingly little about the influence of 
auditors in the banking industry.4 Finally, this study contributes to the small but growing 
literature on fair value auditing. Although the challenges surrounding fair value auditing 
have been documented in the regulators’ inspection reports and academic discussions (e.g. 
Bell and Griffin, 2012; Cannon and Bedard, 2015), little is known from the investors’ 
perspective. This study provides evidence that, consistent with the PCAOB’s criticisms 
on fair value audit deficiencies, investors place incremental value on high audit quality in 
their pricing decisions about fair value estimates.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review 
the related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design 
                                                 
4 See, for example, DeFond and Zhang (MKJR) for a recent review on audit quality research. 
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and variable measurement. Section 4 describes the sample selection and descriptive 
statistics, and Section 5 discusses the empirical results. In Section 6, I describe the cross-
sectional analysis and present the findings. Section 7 provides robustness checks and 
Section 8 concludes. 
* PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 
. Fair Value Hierarchy 
In 2007, FASB adopted FAS 157, Fair Value Measurements, to provide a 
framework for the measurement of fair value estimates. FAS 157 established a hierarchy 
of fair value measurements across three levels based on the source of inputs. Level 1 
inputs are quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities. Level 2 inputs 
are indirectly observable from similar items in active markets; and Level 3 inputs are 
unobservable inputs developed internally from the reporting entity’s assessment of the 
best information available.5 As a result of their observable (unobservable) nature, the 
complexity and subjectivity inherent in fair value estimates increase monotonically from 
Level 1 to Level 3. 
In a recent review paper, Bratten et al. (2013) suggest that the subjectivity of 
indirectly observable Level 2 and unobservable Level 3 inputs induce considerable 
measurement uncertainty. The uncertainty involved in estimation allows room for 
management bias (Lundholm, 1999), and thus as the reliability concerns increases the 
                                                 
5 In the banking industry, examples of Level 1 assets and liabilities include securities and 
derivative contracts that are actively traded on the exchanges. Level 2 assets and liabilities 
include over-the-counter debt instruments and derivative contracts that are traded less frequently 
than those on the exchanges. Finally, examples of Level 3 assets and liabilities include private 
equity investments and derivative contracts that are highly structured. 
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disclosures become less useful to investors (e.g. Richardson et al., 2005; Lev et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, Bratten et al. (2013) predict that measurement uncertainty incrementally 
increases with the fair value hierarchy, with Level 3 inputs having the most substantial 
uncertainty. Consistent with this prediction, studies have shown that reliability concerns 
over Level 3 (and sometimes Level 2) fair value measurements are associated with less 
value relevance (Song et al., 2010; and Kolev, 2008), greater information risk (Riedl and 
Serafeim, 2011), and higher audit fees (Ettredge et al. 2010). 
Using more than 400 banks from the first three quarters of 2008, Song et al. (2010) 
examine the value relevance of FAS 157 fair value hierarchy. They find that, while all 
level information is value relevant, Level 3 assets and liabilities are valued much less 
than Level 1 and Level 2. They interpret the evidence as investors placing less weight on 
Level 3 as a result of the underlying estimation uncertainties and possible reporting bias. 
Similarly, Kolev (2008) examines FAS 157 disclosures for 172 financial firms for the 
first two quarters of 2008 and observes that the valuation multiples on Level 3 are much 
lower than Level 1 fair value measurements. 
Besides value relevance studies, the literature also examines the risk relevance of 
FAS 157. Riedl and Serafeim (2011) study FAS 157 disclosures for 952 financial firm-
quarters spanning Q3 in 2007 through Q2 in 2008 and find an incremental positive 
association between firm-specific equity beta and fair value assets reported across the fair 
value hierarchy. Specifically, their results suggest that higher exposure to Level 3 fair 
value assets leads to increased information risk, and investors thereby require a higher 
cost of capital. Furthermore, Ettredge et al. (2010) provide evidence that auditors charge 
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higher fees for auditing greater proportions of Level 3 fair value assets, suggesting audit 
risk and effort increases with the fair value hierarchy. 
Contrary to studies finding Level 3 fair value estimates are less value relevant 
than Levels 1 and 2, Altamuro and Zhang (2013) study the mortgage servicing rights 
(MSRs) and find that MSRs estimated using Level 3 inputs are at least as value relevant 
as Level 2 inputs. However, Altamuro and Zhang (2013) focus on a single financial 
instrument (i.e. MSRs) with institutional features such that the managerial inputs (i.e. 
Level 3) are perceived to be mostly appropriate. Therefore, as suggested by Hendricks 
and Shakespeare (2013) in their discussion paper, it is difficult to draw generalizable 
conclusions about the relative reliability across the hierarchy of fair value measurements 
from the results of MSRs. 
In another recent paper, Lawrence et al. (2016) study a sample of closed-end 
funds and find that Level 3 fair value measurements are not less reliable than Level 1 and 
Level 2 in those funds. The authors attribute these results to the fact that fair value 
measurements constitute only a small part of total assets in banks (15% in Song et al. 
(2010) and 35% in Kolev (2008)), whereas in the closed-end funds fair value 
measurements are available for substantially all assets (97% in their sample). Although 
total assets measured at fair value are significantly higher in closed-end funds, the 
proportion of Level 3 fair value measurements in close-end funds are not much higher 
than those of banks. In particular, the mean values of Level 3 fair value assets to total 
assets are 2.2% in Lawrence et al. (2016), as compared to 2.8% in Kolev (2008), and 0.5% 
in Song et al. (2010). The main difference between closed-end funds and banks is 
10 
 
frequency and amount of Level 1 and Level 2 fair value measurements. Specifically, the 
proportion of Level 1 (Level 2) fair value measurements to total assets is 26.2% (68.8%) 
in Lawrence et al. (2016), 6.4% (27.3%) in Kolev (2008) and 1.2% (13.3%) in Song et al 
(2010). 
Given that prior results on whether investors perceive opaque Level 3 fair value 
measurements as less reliable are mixed, I will first re-evaluate the relative reliability of 
fair value hierarchy for my sample of U.S. public banks covering the years 2008 to 2013. 
. Reliability of Fair Value Hierarchy  
The value relevance and risk relevance of fair value estimates varies with the 
reliability of underlying information; prior literature has identified a number of factors 
that influence investors’ perceptions towards the reliability of reported fair value 
estimates. Dietrich et al. (2001) and Muller and Riedl (2002) both study the U.K. 
investment property industry and find fair value estimates are more reliable for firms 
employing external (as opposed to internal) appraisers. Prior studies also find the 
investors’ pricing of fair value measurements is influenced by banks’ capital adequacy. 
Kolev (2008) finds investors’ reliability concerns about Level 3 fair value measurements 
are greater for banks with low level of capital. Similarly, Goh et al. (2015) demonstrate 
evidence that market pricing of Level 1 and Level 2 fair value assets are lower for banks 
with low capital adequacy ratios, however, they do not find any effect of capital adequacy 
on Level 3 fair value relevance. Moreover, Riedl and Serafeim (2011) show that the high-
quality ex-ante information environment also mitigates investors’ reliability concerns of 
reported fair value estimates. 
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Prior studies examine the effect of corporate governance on investors’ perceptions 
towards the reliability of reported fair value estimates. Both Song et al. (2010) and Bhat 
(2013) provide evidence showing that fair value measurements of banks with strong 
corporate governance are perceived as more reliable. More specifically, Song et al. (2010) 
measure corporate governance using a corporate governance factor-score loaded with six 
variables including board independence, audit committee financial expertise, frequency 
of audit committee meetings, institutional shareholdings, internal control weakness, and 
office-level audit fee revenue. They document a positive association between the 
governance rank variable and pricing of Level 2 and Level 3 fair value assets, supporting 
the greater impact of governance on value relevance of Level 2 and Level 3. 
My study is related to Song et al. (2010) in that we are both examining the extent 
to which monitoring can mitigate concerns over fair value reliability. My study differs 
from Song et al (2010) in the following ways. First, instead of looking at a general 
composite corporate governance measure, I focus on the particular monitoring attribute: 
the quality of the external auditor. Auditors perform independent verification of financial 
reports. As such, auditor quality (as opposed to board independence, audit committee 
characteristics, and institutional shareholding) is expected to have a first-order impact on 
the credibility of manager-prepared financial reporting (DeAngelo, 1981), thereby 
mitigating investors’ uncertainty and lowering perceived risk (Lambert et al., 2007). 
Second, I extend the value relevance results with additional tests on whether the risk 
relevance of fair value estimates varies with audit quality. The risk relevance results 
provide corroborative evidence on the effect of audit quality in mitigating reliability 
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concerns. Third, Song et al. (2010) only focus on the first three quarters of 2008, which 
coincides with market disorder during the financial crisis period when many fair value 
assets become illiquid and hard to value. It is unclear whether their results were driven by 
investors’ reliability concerns or the chaos in the financial market. Therefore, my study 
complements Song et al. (2010) in that I examine a first-order governance effect (i.e. 
audit quality) on both the value and risk relevance of fair value measurements during an 
extended period of time incorporating both the financial crisis period and its aftermath. 
Furthermore, my cross-sectional analyses extend Song et al. (2010) by showing how the 
impact of audit quality on the pricing of fair value estimates varies is conditioned on bank 
size and differences in banks’ capital adequacy. 
. Impact of Audit Quality on the Reliability of Fair Value Hierarchy  
Investors are likely to be concerned with the reliability of fair value estimates and 
especially Level 3 fair value estimates because of estimation uncertainties as well as 
management’s subjective reporting bias inherent in fair value measurements. I argue that 
high-quality auditors can reduce the uncertainties associated with fair value estimates for 
two reasons. First, prior studies have shown that high-quality auditors have greater 
monitoring ability to improve error and misstatement detection (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1981). Auditing fair value estimates often requires an auditor’s ability to evaluate a wide 
range of factors consisting of liquidity analysis, macroeconomics, product mix, statistics, 
and market conditions, and to perform complex tasks such as assessing inputs to models, 
appropriateness of methods, and reasonableness of the conclusions. As such, a high-
quality auditor with competent knowledge and skills in auditing the complex valuation 
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models will have a great ability to mitigate the reliability concerns relating to fair value 
estimates. Second, high-quality auditors also have greater reputation and litigation 
incentive to deter management’s opportunistic fair value reporting as they have “more to 
lose” if they fail to report a client’s breach (DeAngelo, 1981). Auditors’ concerns over 
potential litigation costs and reputation loss create incentive for them to restrain managers’ 
choices to overstate (understate) fair value assets (liabilities), which in turn improves the 
reliability of reported fair value measurements. 
Prior studies, using the Big N auditor to proxy for audit quality, find that clients 
of Big N auditors have higher earnings quality (Francis and Wang, 2008) and lower risks 
of frauds (Lennox and Pittman, 2010). Furthermore, studies investigating capital market 
participants’ perceptions of audit quality find firms audited by Big N auditors are 
associated with higher earnings response coefficients (Teoh and Wong, 1993) and lower 
cost of capital (Khurana and Raman, 2004). In addition to an auditor’s Big N membership, 
many recent studies have shown that industry specialist auditors are able to perform 
higher quality audits than their non-industry specialist peers. As noted in the review paper 
of DeFond and Zhang (2014), industry specialization provides a measure of audit quality 
variation within the Big N auditors. Auditors can possess industry expertise by investing 
in industry-specific technology and human resources. The accumulation of industry-
specific knowledge and experience can improve audit quality, and thus financial 
reporting credibility (Hammersley, 2006). Many studies have shown that specialist 
auditors are able to perform higher quality audits, which are recognized and valued by 
investors (e.g. Knechel et al., 2007; Krishnan et al., 2013). In the area of banking audit, 
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prior research finds that clients of high-quality banking auditors as captured by Big N or 
banking specialists are associated with higher market valuation of loan loss provision 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2009), reduced income-increasing accruals (Kanagaretnam et al., 
2010), and less loan loss provision based and transaction based earnings management 
(Bratten et al., 2015).  
To empirically assess the extent to which audit quality can mitigate investors’ 
reliability concerns over fair value measurements, I rely on prior research, which 
indicates that fair value estimates are relevant to investors’ equity-pricing decisions 
(Song et al., 2010), and are associated with the information risk of firms (Riedl and 
Serafeim, 2011). My primary hypothesis is that high-quality audits will lower 
uncertainties associated with fair value estimates and, hence, mitigate reliability concerns. 
Specifically, I predict that higher reliability leads investors to place greater weight on fair 
value estimates in their equity-pricing decisions. And an increase in reliability leads to 
lower information risk associated with fair value estimates, thus less information 
asymmetry between investors and management. This provides the basis for the following 
hypotheses: 
H1a: A high-quality audit increases the value relevance of a bank’s fair value 
estimates. 
H1b: A high-quality audit is negatively associated with the information risk 
underlying a bank’s fair value estimates. 
Next, I examine whether the effect of audit quality varies differentially across the 
three levels of fair value hierarchy. Investors are likely to have higher reliability concerns 
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for more opaque fair value measurements without observable market prices (i.e. Level 3) 
than for inputs that are observable in markets (i.e. Levels 1 and 2). If high-quality audits 
lower uncertainties associated with fair value estimates, I predict that the audit quality 
effect is greater for Level 3 fair value estimates than for Levels 1 and 2. This leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
H2a: The effect of audit quality on the value relevance of a bank’s fair value 
estimates is greater for Level S than for Levels J and M.  
H2b: The negative association between audit quality and the information risk 
underlying a bank’s fair value estimates is greater for Level S than for 
Levels J and M. 
The following arguments provide tension against these hypotheses. First, if bank 
investors do not see that Level 3 fair value estimates are less reliable than Levels 1 and 2, 
as evidenced in the valuation of mortgage servicing rights (Altamuro and Zhang, 2013) 
and closed-end funds (Lawrence et al. 2016), then I would not find that auditors have a 
differential impact across the three levels. Second, because FAS 157 also requires 
mandatory disclosure of key assumptions and modeling techniques specific for Level 3 
fair value measurements. Ryan (2008) discusses how this detailed disclosure could 
reduce measurement uncertainty in Level 3 fair value measurements. As such, if investors’ 
reliability concerns of Level 3 fair value estimates are not higher than that of Levels 1 
and 2, then I will find results that are biased against H2. 
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. RESEARCH DESIGN  
. Effect of Audit Quality on Equity Pricing of Fair Value Estimates (Ha 
and Ha) 
I estimate the pricing effect of audit quality on fair value estimates by extending 
the model in Song et al. (2010): 
 = 	
 + 	 + 	 + 	 ∗  + 	 +
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Consistent with value relevance literature, the baseline regression (excluding 
AuditQ and FVA*AuditQ) is a modified Ohlson (1995) model that estimates the 
association between share price and fair value assets. The dependent variable, PRICE, is 
the closing share price on 10-K filing date.6 FVA is the total fair value assets. I focus on 
fair value assets as opposed to fair value liabilities as the frequency and amount of fair 
value assets greatly exceed those of fair value liabilities in my sample.7 NFVA and NFVL 
are non-fair value assets and liabilities, and EPS is earnings. All variables are on a per-
share basis. 8 
To test H1a, I add an audit quality measure (AuditQ) and its interaction term with 
fair value assets (FVA*AuditQ) to examine the value investors place on audit quality of 
                                                 
6  For a robustness check, I alternatively define PRICE as share price measured at the three 
months after the fiscal year-end date, and find similar results. 
7  The average ratio of total fair value liabilities to assets is only J% in my sample. More 
specifically, Level J liabilities are different from zero in only MKP of M,TJL observations. Level M 
liabilities are different from zero in only PLS observations, while Level S liabilities are different 
from zero in only SNJ observations.  
8 Barth and Clinch (MKKN) investigate the effectiveness at mitigating scale effects in the modified 
Ohlson (JNNL) model and show that share-deflated specification, as opposed to equity book value-
deflated, lagged price-deflated, return, and equity market value-deflated, perform the best. 
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banks’ fair value estimates. Following prior studies that show Big N auditors have higher 
audit quality (e.g. Teoh and Wong, 1993; Khurana and Raman, 2004), the first audit 
quality measure, Big4, is a dummy variable that captures banks audited by a Big 4 auditor. 
The second audit quality measure, Expert, reflects an auditor’s banking industry 
specialization, where specialization is captured by an auditor’s within-banking market 
share. I measure an auditor’s banking market share using the number of banks it audited, 
as there are several mid-tier auditors that provide services only to financial firms and 
have a large market share of banking audits. For instance, a second-tier auditing firm, 
Crowe Horwath LLP, audits 357 of the 2,615 bank-years (13.7%) in the sample, and 
accounts for the second largest market share. 9  I assume such a deep industry 
specialization makes these auditors banking industry experts. Moreover, DeFond and 
Zhang (2014) point out that a major limitation of existing industry specialization 
measures is that they are typically measured dichotomously, and thus implicitly assume a 
homogeneous level of audit quality within each group (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994). To 
address this limitation, Expert is measured as the decile rank of an auditor’s market share 
in the banking industry based on the number of banks audited in a year. 
The variable of interest is the interaction term FVA*AuditQ, which captures the 
incremental effect of audit quality on investors’ pricing of fair value assets. H1a predicts 
a positive association between audit quality and investors’ pricing of fair value estimates. 
That is, if investors perceive that a high-quality audit can reduce reliability concerns 
relating to estimation uncertainties and reporting bias in fair value estimates, the 
                                                 
9 KPMG LLP, which audits RPK out of the M,TJL bank-years (JP.R%) in the sample, accounts for 
the largest market share.  
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coefficient on FVA*AuditQ is predicted to be positive (i.e. 	 > 0). 
To examine H2a, the differential audit quality effect on the pricing of Level 3 fair 
value estimates and that of Level 1 and 2, I further decompose fair value assets (FVA) in 
Equation (1) into its Level 3 (FVA3), and combined Level 1 and 2 (FVA12) components. 
I estimate the following model, where audit quality (AuditQ) is interacted with Level 3 
and combined Level 1 and 2 fair value assets, respectively: 
 = 	
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Following predictions in H2a, I expect that high audit quality has greater impact 
on investors’ pricing of Level 3 fair value measurements, where investors’ reliability 
concerns are likely higher than that of Level 1 and 2. Accordingly, I predict the 
coefficient of FVA3*AuditQ is greater than the coefficient of FVA12*AuditQ (i.e. 	 >
	). 
. Effect of Audit Quality on Information Risk Underlying Fair Value 
Estimates (Hb and Hb) 
To investigate the effect of audit quality in mitigating information risk associated 
with fair value estimates, I build upon prior research by examining whether high audit 
quality is associated with reduced information asymmetry, as reflected in the lower bid-
ask spreads underlying banks’ fair value estimates. Based on the bid-ask spread theory in 
the finance literature (e.g. Stoll 1978a, 1978b; Glosten and Milgrom 1985), I estimate the 
following model: 
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The dependent variable, LogSPREAD, is the natural log of bank i’s average bid-
ask spread in year t, measured daily as ask price less bid price divided by the mid-point 
price. Following prior research, I include LogPRICE, the natural log of bank i’s average 
daily share price in year t, to control for order processing costs underlying bid-ask spread 
(Stoll, 1978b). Since order processing costs decrease in proportion to share price, 	 is 
predicted to be negative. LogTURN, the natural log of bank i’s number of shares traded 
daily divided by the number of shares outstanding in year t, controls for the stock 
liquidity and has a predicted negative sign (Demsetz, 1968). LogRISK, the natural log of 
bank i’s variance of daily stock returns, controls for the riskiness of the bank’s shares and 
has a predicted positive sign (Barne and Logue, 1975). I also control for the percentage of 
insider shareholdings (INSIDER%) and institutional shareholdings (INSTIT%), as both 
corporate insiders and institutional investors could profit from their lower information 
trading costs and thereby increase the information asymmetry among other investors. 
Hence, they have a predictive positive sign on bid-ask spread (Chiang and Venkatesh, 
1988).  
FVA and AuditQ are the same as previously defined. Again, the variable of 
interest in Equation (3) is the interaction term FVA*AuditQ, which captures the 
incremental effect of audit quality on information asymmetry underlying fair value assets. 
H1b predicts a negative association between audit quality and information risk. That is, 
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high-quality audits lower measurement uncertainties and thus reduce the information 
asymmetry risk in the bid-ask spread; therefore FVA*AuditQ has a predicted negative 
sign (i.e. 	 < 0).  
Consistent with the previous approach, I estimate the following model where 
audit quality (AuditQ) is interacted with Level 3 (FVA3) and combined Level 1 and 2 
(FVA12) fair value assets, respectively, to examine H2b: 
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Following predictions in H2b, I expect that the effect of audit quality is stronger 
in mitigating information risk associated with Level 3 fair value estimates, where 
reliability concerns are higher than that of Levels 1 and 2. Specifically, H2b predicts that 
the coefficient of FVA3*AuditQ is more negative than the coefficient of FVA12*AuditQ 
(i.e. 	 < 	). 
All regression models use t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at 
firm level. While Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010) suggest that two-way clustered 
standard errors produce well-specified test statistics, Cameron et al. (2011) show that 
cluster-robust statistics will over-reject a true null when the number of clusters is small, 
hence researchers should exercise caution applying time-clustering when the number of 
time periods is small. Since my sample period spans just six years, I do not time-cluster 
standard errors for the main analysis. Nonetheless, to address the concerns about time-
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series dependence in my sample, in a robustness test, I repeat all analysis using quarterly 
data, which gives more periods for time clustering. My inferences do not change. I also 
include year fixed effects in all the regressions, since Goh et al. (2015) observe time-
trend in the pricing of fair value hierarchy. 
/ SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
8. Sample Selection  
I focus on publicly listed banks during the period 2008 to 2013. FAS 157 is 
mandated for fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2007. However, many large 
financial institutions early adopted the standard for fiscal year 2007 voluntarily. In order 
to avoid self-selection bias, I do not include 2007 in my sample. I choose to study the 
banking industry because of its substantial exposure to financial instruments measured 
across the fair value hierarchy (Riedl and Serafeim, 2011). Therefore, I expect this setting 
to maximize the power of my tests.  
The initial sample consists of 3,728 bank-years for 823 unique banks with non-
missing and non-zero fair value assets from the Compustat Bank Fundamentals Annual 
Database. I then exclude observations with missing price information in the CRSP 
database and missing auditor information in the Audit Analytics database. Table 1 Panel 
A presents details of the sample selection. The final sample consists of 2,615 bank-year 
observations for 582 unique banks.  
Sample distributions by year and institutional type are shown in Table 1 Panels B 
and Panel C. Most of the banks in my sample are commercial banks (74%) and the 
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remaining are savings institutions.10 
8. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of variables used in my tests. Panel A 
shows descriptive of the full sample (N=2,615), Panel B separately shows descriptive of 
banks audited by Big 4 auditors (N=909) and non-Big 4 auditors (N=1,706), and banks 
audited by Crowe Horwath (N=357).  
In Panel A, the full sample mean (median) share price (PRICE) is $15.4 ($11.6) 
per share and the mean (median) LogSPREAD is -3.3 (-3.32). Similar to Song et al. 
(2010), on a per-share basis, the mean fair value assets using Level 1 inputs (FVA1), 
Level 2 inputs (FVA2), and Level 3 inputs (FVA3) are 3.1, 32.6, and 1.0, respectively. 
Consistent with my focus on the fair value assets, the proportion of fair value assets to 
total assets (TFVA/AT) is 18.0%, whereas the proportion of fair value liabilities to total 
assets (TFVL/AT) is only 1.0%. The sample firms have a much larger proportion of Level 
2 fair value assets, compared to Level 1 and Level 3, the relative amounts of Level 1, 
Level 2, and Level 3 fair value measurements are consistent with the literature (e.g. Riedl 
and Serafeim, 2011; Ettredge et al., 2014). Unlike public industrial firms where Big 4 
audit firms dominate (e.g. Khurana and Raman, 2004), only 35% of public banks are 
audited by a Big 4 auditor (Big4) in my sample. Finally, these descriptive statistics 
demonstrate that the distribution of a number of variables is skewed. To avoid the 
influence of extreme outliers in the regression analysis, I truncate all continuous variables 
at the 1st and 99th percentile in the regressions. 
                                                 
10 My results are robust to inclusion of institution fixed effect. 
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Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of banks audited by Big 4 auditors, non-
Big 4 auditors and Crowe Horwath LLP, respectively. While the mean of share price 
(PRICE), fair value assets at each level (FVA1, FVA2, FVA3), and total assets (AT) are 
significantly higher in Big 4 banks than that of non-Big 4 banks and Crowe Horwath 
audited banks, the proportion of fair value assets to total assets are similar across the 
three groups (19%, 18%, and 18%), suggesting the importance of fair value 
measurements across all banks. 
In Panel C, I report a correlation matrix, which contains Pearson’s product 
moment correlation coefficients between the regression variables. As expected, 
correlations among fair value variables are high, and correlations among the measures of 
audit quality are also high. Fair value measurements are correlated with audit quality, but 
the correlation coefficients are all below 0.16, suggesting little evidence of 
multicollinearity. 
0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
;. Effect of Audit Quality on Equity Pricing of Fair Value Estimates (Ha 
and Ha) 
Table 3 Panel A presents the results of H1a. Column 1 shows the baseline 
regression where I replicate prior studies examining the value relevance of fair value 
assets in my sample. The positive and significant coefficient on FVA in Column 1 (	 = 
0.246, t-stat = 3.39) indicates that fair value assets are relevant to investors’ pricing 
decisions. Columns 2 and 3 show results of Equation (1) when audit quality measure 
(AuditQ) is Big4 and Expert, respectively. The coefficient on the interaction term of 
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FVA*AuditQ is 0.140 (0.084), with a t-stat = 6.02 (1.88) for Big4 (Expert), indicating 
investors’ pricing of fair value estimates is higher for a bank audited by a Big 4 auditor or 
a banking specialist auditor than its peer banks audited by a non-Big 4 or non-specialist 
auditor. Consistent with predictions in H1a, investors’ pricing of fair value estimates is 
positively associated with both audit quality measures. 
As expected, both NFVA and EPS are positive and significant and NFVL is 
negative and significant. Barth and Clinch (2009) suggest that the coefficient on non-fair 
value assets (NFVA) would be between 0 and 1, whereas the coefficient on non-fair value 
liabilities (NFVL) would be between 0 and -1. The coefficients reported in Table 3 Panel 
A are consistent with this implication. 
Economically, every dollar of a bank’s fair value assets per share audited by a Big 
4 auditor show an average increase in investor’s pricing of 0.140 per share compared 
with banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors. That is equivalent to an average increase of 
$214 million in market value for fair value assets audited by a Big 4 auditor.11 
Table 4 Panel A presents the results of H2a. Column 1 shows the baseline 
regression where I examine the value relevance of fair value hierarchy in my sample. The 
positive and significant coefficient on FVA12 (	 = 0.175, t-stat = 2.59) and the negative 
and insignificant coefficient on FVA3 in Column 1 (	 = -0.075, t-stat = -0.43) are 
consistent with prior studies that find more opaque Level 3 fair value estimates are 
associated with less value relevance (e.g. Kolev, 2008; Song et al., 2010). Columns 2 and 
                                                 
11 The $MJR million increase in market capitalization for Big R audited banks is calculated as JR% 
(the coefficient on FVA*Big8) times $J,LMN millions market capitalization (the mean share price 
($JL.SL) times the number of shares (NN.TJ million), from Table M Panel A for the full sample). 
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3 show results of Equation (2) when audit quality measure (AuditQ) is Big4 and Expert, 
respectively. In both columns, I find magnitude on the interaction term between Level 3 
fair value assets and audit quality (FVA3*AuditQ) is greater than that of Level 1 and 2 
(FVA12*AuditQ). Specifically, the coefficient of FVA3*Big4 is 0.870 (t-stat = 2.61) and 
the coefficient of FVA12*Big4 is 0.019 (t-stat = 0.29), and the coefficient of 
FVA3*Expert is 1.086 (t-stat = 2.18) and the coefficient of FVA12*Expert is 0.080 (t-stat 
= 1.65). Results of F-tests at the bottom of the table further reveal that the effect of audit 
quality on pricing of Level 3 fair value assets (	) is significantly higher than that of 
Levels 1 and 2 (	), p-value = 0.006, and 0.024 for Big 4 and Expert. These results are 
consistent with predictions in H2a, supporting the greater impact of audit quality in 
mitigating investors’ reliability concerns over more opaque Level 3 fair value 
measurements. 
;. Effect of Audit Quality on Information Risk Underlying Fair Value 
Estimates (Hb and Hb) 
In this section, I discuss the results of tests examining the effect of audit quality 
on information risk. The results of H1b and H2b are presented in Panel B of Table 3 and 
Table 4, respectively. Consistent with predictions in H1b, results in Table 3 Panel B show 
that banks employing high quality Big 4 auditors or banking specialist auditors have a 
significantly lower bid-ask spread associated with fair value assets (FVA*AuditQ = -
0.001, t-stat = -5.35 and -4.71). Economically, a bank’s bid-ask spread is, on average, 0.1% 
lower for fair value assets audited by a Big 4 auditor than for fair value assets audited by 
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a non-Big 4 auditor.12 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 Panel B show results of Equation (4) for Big4 and 
Expert, respectively. In both columns, I find the interaction term between Level 3 fair 
value assets and audit quality (FVA3*AuditQ) is more negative than that of Levels 1 and 
2 (FVA12*AuditQ). Specifically, the coefficient of FVA3*Big4 is -0.014 (t-stat = -4.04), 
while the coefficient of FVA12*Big4 is -0.000 (t-stat = -1.88), and the coefficient of 
FVA3*Expert is -0.015 (t-stat = -2.70), while the coefficient of FVA12*Expert is -0.000 
(t-stat = -0.83). Moreover, results of F-tests at the bottom of Table 4 Panel B reveal that 
differences in magnitudes of the two interaction terms are statistically significant, p-value 
< 0.001 (p-value = 0.004) for Big4 (Expert). These results are consistent with predictions 
in H2b. Investors perceive high-quality audits reduce measurement uncertainties and 
management bias relating to more opaque Level 3 fair value assets, and thus lower the 
information asymmetry risk in the bid-ask spread. The results of H2b provide 
corroborative evidence to findings in H2a, supporting the greater impact of audit quality 
in mitigating investors’ reliability concerns over Level 3 fair value measurements. 
1 CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS   
>. Partitioning on Bank Sizes 
My first audit quality measure is based on auditor size (Big4), and, as shown in 
the descriptive statistics, large banks are audited by Big 4 firms and hence are viewed as 
having high audit quality. To disentangle my results from the possibility of an 
endogenous relation with bank size, I divide the sample into small and large banks; and 
                                                 
12 The K.J% decrease in bid-ask spread is calculated as the exponential of the coefficient on 
FVA*Big8 (-K.KKJ). 
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re-examine the hypothesis in H2 in the two subsamples. Using quartile partition of the 
annual distribution of banks’ total assets, a small (large) bank is one with total assets 
among the bottom (top) quartile of the sample distribution.13  
Table 5 Panel A reports the results of audit quality effect on equity pricing in 
small and large banks separately. I find the coefficients of FVA3*AuditQ are consistently 
higher for small banks (	 = 2.206 and 1.795) than for large banks (	 = 0.364 and 1.216) 
under both audit quality measures. Table 5 Panel B reports the results of audit quality 
effect on bid-ask spread in small and large banks separately. I find the coefficients of 
FVA3*Big4 are more negative for small banks (	 = -0.055) than for large banks (	 = --
-0.003). These results suggest that investors value high audit quality more for small banks 
whose accounting information is less transparent than large banks (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993). However, I do not find FVA3*Expert to be different in the bid-ask spread across 
small and large banks.  
>. Partitioning on Banks’ Capital Adequacy 
Banks are subject to risk-based capital guidelines issued by banking regulators 
and are required to maintain a capital ratio above a certain minimum threshold. Prior 
studies find regulatory capital ratios can affect banks’ accounting choices (e.g. Beatty et 
al. 1995; Kim and Kross 1998; Moyer 1990). Banks with a declining regulatory capital 
might have regulatory reporting incentives as well as stock market incentives to report 
fair value estimates opportunistically for capital management purposes. Accordingly, I 
expect that investors perceive banks with a declining capital ratio to have higher 
                                                 
13 Results are similar when using alternative partition criteria of bottom/top quintile or tercile. 
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reliability concerns relating to estimation errors and management bias of fair value assets. 
Therefore, I predict audit quality will have a greater impact for those banks. 
Table 6 reports the results of audit quality effect on equity pricing and bid-ask 
spread for banks with and without a decline in capital adequacy. Specifically, a decline in 
capital adequacy is measured by a decrease in a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio year on year. 
The pricing test result shows that the coefficients of FVA3*AuditQ are consistently higher 
for banks with a declining Tier 1 capital ratio (	 = 0.944 and 1.306) than for banks 
without a declining Tier 1 capital ratio (	 = 0.339 and 0.968) under both audit quality 
measures. Additionally, the bid-ask spread test result show that the coefficients of 
FVA3*AuditQ are consistently more negative for banks with a declining Tier 1 capital 
ratio (	 = -0.016 and -0.019) than for banks whose Tier 1 capital ratio increased or 
unchanged (	 = -0.006 and 0.005). Results in Table 6 suggest that banks with reduced 
regulatory capital exhibit stronger audit quality effect on investors’ pricing of fair value 
estimates. 
2 SENSITIVITY TESTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
In order to control for design issues or variable definition choices that could drive 
my results, I have additionally conducted several sensitivity tests. 
A. Potential Endogeneity of Auditor Choice 
A lingering concern that remains is the endogeneity of auditor choice. For 
example, it could be that firms with greater information asymmetry tend to hire higher-
quality auditors to mitigate investors’ concerns. Therefore, I perform the Heckman’s two-
stage approach to control for the potential auditor selection bias (Heckman, 1979). In the 
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first stage, I estimate a probit model to identify factors affecting a bank’s decision to 
appoint a Big 4 auditor. Following the auditor choice model in the literature (e.g. 
Guedhami et al., 2014), the determinant variables include firm size (Size), asset structure 
(AssetStructure), financial leverage (Leverage), return on assets (Profitability), growth 
(Growth) and new finance (NewFinance). Results of the first stage regression are shown 
in Table 7 Panel A.  
In the second stage, the inverse Mills ratio (IMR_Big4) derived from auditor 
choice model is included in Equation (1) – (4) to control for a bank’s non-random 
selection of a Big 4 auditor. As shown in Table 7 Panels B and C, I find that the sign and 
significance of the coefficient estimates are consistent across different estimation models 
even after controlling for the potential auditor selection bias, suggesting that my previous 
results are robust. The significance of IMR_Big4 coefficients also provides some 
evidence of selectivity bias as expected.  
A. Controlling for Bank Size Effect 
As shown in the descriptive statistics, banks audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 
auditors differ significantly in size. To address the concern that my previous findings are 
not simply capturing the size effect on share prices or bid-ask spreads, I repeat my 
analysis using two size-matched subsamples. The two size-matched samples are 
constructed by matching a Big 4 audited bank with a non-Big 4 audited bank with the 
closest total assets in the same fiscal year and the closest market capitalization in the 
same fiscal year, respectively.  
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The matched sample results are reported in Table 8 Panels A and B, the results are 
similar to those in Table 4. The coefficient of FVA3*AuditQ is significantly greater 
(smaller) than the coefficient of FVA12*AuditQ when the dependent variable is share 
price (bid-ask spreads). The results obtained from the matched samples provide further 
evidence supporting the finding that audit quality plays an important role in mitigating 
investors’ reliability concerns over the more opaque Level 3 fair value measurements.  
A. Crisis Period 
Next, I assess the robustness of my results to the exclusion of the financial crisis 
period (2008-2009). In this paper, I argue that the reliability concerns over fair value 
estimates are related to the inherent estimation uncertainties as well as possible 
management reporting bias. Prior studies suggest that the estimation uncertainties can be 
very extreme during the crisis period due to market illiquidity (Ryan, 2008). Moreover, in 
a recent paper, Goh et al. (2015) investigate the value relevance of FAS 157 since the 
crisis. They find, while Level 3 estimates are typically priced lower than Levels 1 and 2 
between 2008 and 2011, the difference reduces over time. This implies that the reliability 
concerns over Level 3 fair value measurements dissipated to some extent as market 
conditions stabilized in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Therefore, to ensure my 
results are not driven by the extreme reliability concerns specific to the financial crisis, I 
repeat the analysis in H2 after excluding the crisis years 2008 and 2009. 
Table 8 Panel C shows the results. The findings are qualitatively the same as in 
Table 4, providing evidence that the effect of audit quality in mitigating reliability 
concerns over fair value estimates exists after the financial crisis. 
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A.8 Controlling for a Bank’s Riskiness 
A bank’s riskiness is likely to be determinant of the pricing of audit quality on fair 
value assets and liabilities, therefore I further control for bank risk by the market-model 
estimate of a bank’s security beta (Beta). Specifically, Beta is estimated from a regression 
of bank-specific monthly returns regressed on the monthly value-weighted market returns 
for the period from three months after the prior fiscal year end to three months after the 
current fiscal year end.  
As shown in Table 10 Panel D, results are similar as those reported in Table 4. In 
addition, the coefficient of Beta is positive and significant in all regressions, consistent 
with how a bank’s systematic risk influences the market’s assessment of firm’s value (e.g. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al, 2009). 
A.; SEC Comment Letters 
In my main analysis, the audit quality variables (Big4 and Expert) measure ex 
ante perceived audit quality of fair value measurements. To provide evidence of the 
extent to which the perceived audit quality measures reflect the actual audit quality of fair 
value measurements, I examine whether banks audited by perceived higher quality 
auditors are less likely to receive SEC comment letters related to fair value measurements. 
The SEC reviews a public company’s corporate fillings at least once every three 
years, with an objective to ‘to monitor and enhance compliance with the applicable 
disclosure and accounting requirements’. 14  During this process, many reviews are 
completed without any comment letters being issued. However, if the SEC staff identifies 
                                                 
14  See the description of the filing review process on the SEC website: 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/Article/filing-review-process---corp-fin.html 
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any potential areas of non-compliance, it then issues a comment letter to the company 
requesting supplemental information, explanation or revision. When a comment letter is 
received, the company responds to each comment by submitting additional information or 
amending the filing under review. Several rounds of comments and responses may occur 
until all issues are cleared. The reviews have traditionally been a main source of 
uncovering accounting irregularities and disclosure deficiencies (Brown et al., 2014), 
suggesting that firms receiving comment letters have likely exhibited low reporting 
quality (Hribar et al., 2014). Therefore, in this test, I assume that receiving (not receiving) 
a SEC comment letter on fair value issues is an indicator of low (high) quality in fair 
value reporting. That is, if the SEC raises a fair value-related issue during their review 
process then it reveals the potential deficiencies specific to fair value, suggesting a lower 
audit quality on fair value measurements or disclosure. 
Controlling for factors associated with receipt of a comment letter identified in a 
prior study (Cassell et al., 2013), I examine whether the perceived high audit quality is 
associated with the decreased probability of receiving a comment letter. The SEC 
comment letters data is obtained from the Audit Analytics Database. I focus on comment 
letters that apply to 10-K filings that specifically mention fair value issues (in Audit 
Analytics variable ‘list_cl_issue_phrase’). 283 of the 2,615 bank-year observations (i.e. 
10.8%) receive an SEC comment letter.  
While the negative coefficient of audit quality measures (AuditQ) in Table 9 
Column 1 (i.e. Big4) is directionally consistent with prior studies finding that clients of 
Big 4 auditors are less likely to receive 10-K comment letters (Cassell et. al., 2013), the 
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result is not statistically significant (Big4 = -0.206, t-stat = -0.91). The estimated 
coefficient in Column 2 shows that banks audited by banking specialist auditors are less 
likely to receive a 10-K comment letter on fair value issues than their peers audited by 
non-specialist auditors (Expert = -0.710, t-stat = -1.93).  
A.> Quarterly Analysis 
In this section, I extend my analysis using quarterly data to examine whether the 
audit quality effect on pricing of banks’ fair value measurements are stronger in the 
fourth quarter than in the interim quarters. 
While the fourth quarter financial information is audited as part of the annual 
reporting, the first three quarterly reports (i.e. interim reporting) are only required to be 
reviewed. Prior studies document that, relative to interim reports, the fourth quarter report 
is subject to more rigid rules (Palepu, 1988), providing firms with less discretion and few 
opportunities to manipulate (Brown and Pinello, 2007). Furthermore, Comell and 
Landsman (1989) show that fourth quarter earnings announcements have greater stock 
price impact than interim quarters, consistent with auditing decreasing noise in the fourth 
quarter, relative to the first three quarters. 
Accordingly, I re-estimate the hypothesis in H1, adding a dummy variable for the 
fourth quarter (Q4). In this case, the three-way interaction term (Q4*FVA*AuditQ) 
captures the incremental effect of the fourth quarter audit, relative to unaudited interim 
quarters. Those results are shown in Table 10. I find that the estimated coefficient of the 
three-way interaction term Q4*FVA*Expert is positive and significant, while the 
coefficient of Q4*FVA*Big4 is positive but not significantly different from zero. The 
34 
 
results suggest that industry specialist auditors’ effect on pricing of fair value 
measurement is stronger in the fourth quarter. 
3 CONCLUSION 
Motivated by the PCAOB’s concerns over deficiencies in fair value auditing, in 
this study I empirically evaluate the audit quality effect on fair value estimates from 
investors’ perspective. The estimation uncertainties and possible management bias that 
underlie fair value estimates make it an area where investors are concerned about its 
reliability. I argue that high-quality auditors have better monitoring ability and greater 
reputation and litigation incentives to reduce valuation uncertainties associated with fair 
value estimates. Therefore, high-quality auditors may mitigate investors’ reliability 
concerns relating to fair value measurements. 
Using a sample of U.S. public banks during the period 2008 to 2013, I examine 
the impact of audit quality on the value relevance and information risk of financial assets 
reported under FAS 157 fair value hierarchy. I find audits performed by Big 4 auditors 
and banking specialist auditors are positively associated with share prices, and are 
negatively associated with bid-ask spreads, of fair value estimates. My results suggest 
that audit quality adds incremental value to investors as it mitigates their reliability 
concerns related to fair value estimates. In addition, I find the audit quality effect is 
stronger for Level 3 fair value assets than for Levels 1 and 2, supporting the greater audit 
quality effect in mitigating concerns over more opaque financial assets. Further cross-
sectional results show that audit quality effect is stronger for smaller banks and banks 
with declining regulatory capital. My results are robust to control for auditor selection 
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bias, two size matched subsamples, exclusion of the financial crisis, and control for a 
bank’s systematic risk. Finally, I provide evidence that banks audited by banking 
specialist auditors are less likely to receive SEC comment letters on fair value issues, and 
investors of these banks are also valuing fourth quarter auditing more than interim 
quarters reviewing. 
Given that financial services firms were routinely excluded from many prior 
studies of audit quality, my results contribute to our understanding of audit quality in the 
banking industry. More importantly, my results provide evidence that audit quality is 
another factor that influences investors’ pricing decisions on fair value measurements.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Variable Definitions 
Variables  Definitions  
PRICE  
The  share  price  per  share  of  common  stock  for  bank i  in  fiscal  
year t, measured at report 10-K filing date  
LogSPREAD  
The  natural  log  of  bid-ask  spread,  bid-
ask  spread  is  calculated  as  the Difference between daily ask and bid 
price deflated by the midpoint for bank i over fiscal year t  
AuditQ  
Audit quality measures, including Big4 and Expert.  
Big4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is audited by a Big 
4 auditor, and zero otherwise  
Expert is decile rank of an auditor’s market share in the banking 
industry based on the number of banks audited in a year. Expert is 
ranging from 0 to 1 
FVA  
Total fair value assets divided by divided by number of shares 
outstanding at the year end of fiscal year t  
FVA1  
Level 1 fair value assets divided by number of shares outstanding at 
the year end of fiscal year t  
FVA2  
Level 2 fair value assets divided by number of shares outstanding at 
the year end of fiscal year t  
FVA12 
Combined Level 1 and Level 2 fair value assets divided by number of 
shares outstanding at the year end of fiscal year t  
FVA3  
Level 3 fair value assets divided by number of shares outstanding at 
the year end of fiscal year t  
NFVA  
Non-fair value assets divided by number of shares outstanding at the 
year end of fiscal year t  
NFVL  
Non-fair value liabilities divided by number of shares outstanding at 
the year end of fiscal year t  
EPS  
Basic earnings per share excluding extraordinary items at the year end 
of  fiscal year t  
LogPRICE  
The natural log of average daily stock prices for bank I over fiscal 
year t  
LogTURN  
The natural log of TURNOVER, where TURNOVER is the average 
volume of daily shares traded divided by shares outstanding for bank I 
over fiscal year t  
LogRISK  
The natural log of standard deviation of daily returns for bank i over 
fiscal year t  
INSIDER%  The percentage of shareholdings held by insiders (i.e., directors)  
INSTIT%  The percentage of shareholdings held by institutional investors  
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TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Distribution 
Panel A. Sample Selection 
    N 
Unique 
Banks 
Banks in COMPUSTAT Bank Fundamentals Annual 
database 3,728 823 
 with fair value information over the period 2008-2013 
Less Bank-years lacking: 
Price information in the CRSP database 1,049 214 
Auditor information in the Audit Analytics database  64 27 
Final Sample  2,615 582 
Panel B. Distribution by Year 
Fiscal Year   N % 
2008 432 16.5 
2009 472 18.1 
2010 447 17.1 
2011 441 16.9 
2012 406 15.5 
2013 417 15.9 
Total bank-years 2,615 100 
Panel C. Distribution by Institution Type 
Institution Type   N % 
Commercial banks (SIC 6020) 1,924 73.6 
Savings institutions, Federally chartered (SIC 6035) 498 19.0 
Savings institutions, not Federally chartered (SIC 6036) 193 7.4 
Total 2,615 100 
This table presents sample selection and distribution. Panel A presents the sample selection; Panel 
B presents the annual distribution; and Panel C presents the institution type distribution (defined 
using SIC 4-digit code).
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics (N=2,615) 
     Mean  Std. Dev.    Min    P25    Median    P75    Max 
PRICE 15.35  15.53   0.25   6.41   11.60   19.00   221.85  
Number of Shares 99.61 523.17 1.01 5.54 12.15 33.03 10,778.26 
LogSPREAD -3.30 0.53 -4.97 -3.68 -3.32 -2.90 -1.69 
FVA1 3.05 19.76 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.38 418.37 
FVA2 32.58 65.98 0.00 10.19 20.49 37.63 1,661.93 
FVA3 1.00 3.88 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.37 68.22 
AT    28,812  181,198      121      702       1,489       4,374       2,807,491  
LT    26,358  167,456      25      636       1,335       3,905       2,736,580  
TFVA/AT 18.0% 11.0% 0.0% 11.0% 17.0% 24.0% 94.0% 
TFVL/AT 1.0% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 93.0% 
NFVA/AT 81.8% 11.1% 6.2% 76.0% 83.0% 89.3% 100.0% 
NFVL/AT 89.0% 5.7% 0.4% 87.6% 89.8% 91.5% 102.1% 
EPS 0.36  2.67  -26.79   0.02   0.63   1.39   18.80  
NFVA 139.21  138.27   2.41   76.06   114.33   161.65   3,514.17  
NFVL 155.21  162.91   0.27   82.72   126.67   177.09   4,317.57  
TURNOVER 0.47% 2.32% 0.01% 0.09% 0.20% 0.47% 77.55% 
LogRISK -7.04 1.17 -10.05 -7.94 -7.09 -6.17 -2.92 
INSIDER% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 39.0% 
INSTIT% 31.0% 27.0% 0.0% 8.0% 25.0% 52.0% 100.0% 
Big4 0.35  0.48  0 0 0  1   1  
Expert 0.51  0.27   0.10   0.30   0.50   0.70   0.90  
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Panel B. Descriptive Statistics by Auditor Types  
 Big4 (N=909) Non-Big4 (N=1,706) Crowe Horwath (N=357) 
     Mean  Median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median 
PRICE 21.33 16.09 12.17 9.64 12.57 9.50 
Number of Shares 260.62 46.54 13.82 7.67 16.90 10.92 
LogSPREAD -3.38 -3.43 -3.25 -3.27 -3.22 -3.29 
FVA1 5.35 0.16 1.82 0.00 0.47 0.00 
FVA2 46.38 23.58 25.23 19.14 24.45 19.60 
FVA3 1.81 0.11 0.56 0.00 0.53 0.00 
AT     79,842      6,437      1,622       977       1,747       1,376 
LT     73,089      5,714      1,458       868       1,570       1,248 
TFVA/AT 19.0% 17.0% 18.0% 17.0% 18.0% 17.0% 
TFVL/AT 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
NFVA/AT 81.0% 83.0% 82.0% 83.0% 82.0% 83.0% 
NFVL/AT 88.0% 89.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 
EPS 0.92 0.98 0.07 0.47 0.13 0.54 
NFVA 163.12 130.68 126.27 107.40 116.19 96.11 
NFVL 184.91 144.41 139.11 119.68 128.27 111.24 
TURNOVER 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
LogRISK -7.32 -7.38 -6.88 -6.92 -6.91 -7.05 
INSIDER% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
INSTIT% 48.0% 53.0% 22.0% 16.0% 27.0% 22.0% 
Big4 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Expert 0.72 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.73 0.70 
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Panel C. Correlations (N=2,615) 
PRICE 
Log 
SPREAD FVA12 FVA3 NFVA NFVL EPS 
Log 
TURN 
Log 
RISK INSIDER% INSTIT% Big4 
Log 
SPREAD -0.44*** 1.00 
FVA12 0.43*** -0.12*** 1.00 
FVA3 0.24*** -0.01 0.62*** 1.00 
NFVA 0.60*** -0.09*** 0.63*** 0.31*** 1.00 
NFVL 0.61*** -0.09*** 0.71*** 0.35*** 0.99*** 1.00 
EPS 0.60*** -0.53*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 1.00 
LogTURN 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.05** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.05** 1.00 
LogRISK -0.45*** 0.94*** -0.09*** 0.01 -0.05** -0.06*** -0.52*** -0.04** 1.00 
INSIDER% 0.17*** -0.01 0.02 0.04* 0.05** 0.05** 0.04* 0.24*** -0.04** 1.00 
INSTIT% 0.34*** -0.26*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.23*** 0.56*** -0.35*** 0.27*** 1.00 
Big4 0.27*** -0.12*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.53*** -0.18*** 0.20*** 0.46*** 1.00 
Expert 0.15*** -0.04** 0.07*** 0.05** 0.04* 0.05** 0.09*** 0.32*** -0.10*** 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.58*** 
This table presents descriptive statistics and the correlations between the main variables used in the study.  
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for variables used for testing the effect of audit quality on value relevance and risk relevance of FAS 
157 fair value hierarchy in the full sample (N=2,615) over 2008-2013. AT and LT are ending total assets and liabilities in $ millions. 
Number of Shares (Compustat variable CSHO) is measured in millions of shares. 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for banks audited by Big 4 auditors (N=909); banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors (N=1,706); and 
banks audited by Crowe Horwath LLP (N=357), respectively.  
Panel C presents the Pearson correlations for the full sample of 2,615 firm-year observations. *, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
See Appendix 1 for full variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Effect of Audit Quality on the Value- and Risk- Relevance of Fair Value Assets 
Panel A. Effect of Audit Quality on Equity Pricing Panel B. Effect of Audit Quality on Information Risk  
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
Variable Pred sign (1) Baseline (2) Big4 (3) Expert Variable Pred sign (1) Baseline (2) Big4 (3) Expert 
FVA + 0.246*** -0.010 0.208*** FVA - -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
  (3.39) (-1.14) (2.80)   (-3.68) (-1.50) (-0.87) 
AuditQ ?  0.364 2.226* AuditQ ?  0.067*** 0.102*** 
   (0.43) (1.76)    (5.14) (4.83) 
FVA*AuditQ     + (H1a)  0.140*** 0.084* FVA*AuditQ     - (H1b)  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (6.02) (1.88)    (-5.35) (-4.71) 
NFVA + 0.222*** 0.065** 0.238*** LogPRICE - 0.006 0.007 0.009 
(3.07) (2.19) (3.41)   (0.80) (1.16) (1.43) 
NFVL - -0.187** -0.033 -0.206*** LogTURN - 0.066 -0.017 0.048 
(-2.37) (-1.11) (-2.71) (0.38) (-0.13) (0.32) 
EPS + 2.348*** 1.862*** 2.270*** LogRISK + 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.444*** 
(13.27) (8.90) (13.26) (57.07) (57.96) (58.55) 
     INSIDER% + 0.092 0.051 0.013 
     (0.57) (0.40) (0.09) 
INSTIT% + 0.153*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 
(6.99) (5.42) (6.46) 
Intercept 0.557 0.223 -0.385 Intercept -0.243*** -0.256*** -0.285*** 
(0.92) (0.32) (-0.44) (-6.06) (-6.38) (-7.04) 
Fixed Effect     Year    Year    Year Fixed Effect     Year    Year    Year 
N    2,464    2,464    2,464 N    2,460    2,460    2,460 
Adj-R2 0.64 0.66 0.65 Adj-R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 
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This table presents results from regressions in Equation (1) examining the effect of audit quality on the value relevance of total fair value 
assets (FVA) in Panel A, where the dependent variable is share price PRICE. Results from regressions in Equation (3) examining the effect 
of audit quality on the risk relevance of total fair value assets (FVA) are presented in Panel B, where the dependent variable is bid-ask 
spread LogSPREAD. 
In each panel, Column 1 presents the baseline regression; Column 2 presents results when the audit quality measure (AuditQ) is Big 4 
auditor, Big4; and Column 3 presents results when the audit quality measure is banking specialist auditor, Expert. Dummy variable Big4 
equals to one if the bank is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise. Expert is decile rank of the number of banks an 
auditor audited in a given year. 
The sample period is 2008-2013. 
The regressions are pooled OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Year 
fixed effects (untabulated) are included in all estimations. Continuous variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.
  
43
TABLE 4 
Effect of Audit Quality on the Value- and Risk- Relevance of Fair Value Hierarchy of FAS 157 
Panel A. Effect of Audit Quality on Equity Pricing Panel B. Effect of Audit Quality on Information Risk 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
Variable 
Pred  
sign 
(1) 
Baseline (2) Big4 (3) Expert Variable 
Pred  
sign 
(1) 
Baseline (2) Big4 (3) Expert 
FVA12 + 0.175*** -0.027 0.136* FVA12 ? -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
(2.59) (-0.37) (1.96) (-2.24) (-0.22) (-0.44) 
FVA3 ? -0.075 -0.425** -0.723** FVA3 ? -0.003 0.005*** 0.004* 
(-0.43) (-2.06) (-2.54) (-1.54) (2.78) (1.67) 
AuditQ ? 3.373* 1.826 AuditQ ? 0.054*** 0.083*** 
(1.91) (1.37) (3.96) (3.64) 
FVA12*AuditQ ? 0.019 0.080 FVA12*AuditQ ? -0.000* -0.000 
(0.29) (1.65) (-1.88) (-0.83) 
FVA3*AuditQ + 0.870*** 1.086** FVA3*AuditQ - -0.014*** -0.015*** 
(2.61) (2.18) (-4.04) (-2.70) 
NFVA + 0.146** 0.010 0.161*** LogPRICE - 0.006 0.004 0.005 
(2.21) (0.21) (2.82) (0.91) (0.65) (0.71) 
NFVL - -0.103 0.044 -0.121* LogTURN - 0.080 0.020 0.068 
(-1.42) (0.98) (-1.94) (0.43) (0.12) (0.39) 
EPS + 2.455*** 2.508*** 2.369*** LogRISK + 0.444*** 0.444*** 0.444*** 
(13.19) (6.59) (13.52) (57.40) (57.53) (58.24) 
INSIDER% + 0.076 -0.027 -0.011 
(0.47) (-0.17) (-0.07) 
INSTIT% + 0.158*** 0.141*** 0.146*** 
(6.98) (5.47) (6.28) 
Intercept 0.577 1.583 0.001 Intercept -0.238*** -0.249*** -0.272*** 
(0.93) (0.74) (0.00) (-5.89) (-6.14) (-6.68) 
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Fixed Effect     Year    Year       Year Fixed Effect     Year    Year      Year 
N    2,464    2,464       2,464 N    2,460    2,460      2,460 
Adj-R2 0.62 0.64 0.64 Adj-R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 
F-tests (one-sided p-values)  F-tests (one-sided p-values) 
FVA3*AuditQ > FVA12*AuditQ  (H2a) 0.006***  0.024**  FVA3*AuditQ < FVA12*AuditQ  (H2b) 0.000***  0.004***  
 
This table presents results from regression in Equation (2) examining the effect of audit quality on the value relevance of fair value 
hierarchy (FVA12, FVA3) in Panel A, where the dependent variable is share price PRICE. Results from regression in Equation (4) 
examining the effect of audit quality on the risk relevance of fair value hierarchy (FVA12, FVA3) are presented Panel B, where the 
dependent variable is bid-ask spread LogSPREAD. 
In each panel, Column 1 presents the baseline regression. Column 2 presents results when the audit quality measure (AuditQ) is Big 4 
auditor, Big4, and Column 3 presents results when the audit quality measure is banking specialist auditor, Expert. Dummy variable Big4 
equals to one if the bank is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise. Expert is decile rank of the number of banks an 
auditor audited in a given year. 
Below the regressions, I present p-values from F-tests of coefficients testing H2a and H2b. 
The sample period is 2008-2013. 
The regressions are pooled OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Year 
fixed effects (untabulated) are included in all estimations. Continuous variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 5  
Cross-Sectional Analysis on Bank Sizes 
Panel A. Bank Size Effect on Equity Pricing Panel B. Bank Size Effect on Information Risk 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Small Large Small Large Variable Small Large Small Large 
FVA12 0.628*** 0.053 0.601*** 0.063 FVA12 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(8.86) (0.69) (8.12) (1.12) (-0.59) (0.31) (-0.15) (0.08) 
FVA3 0.233* -0.930*** -0.252 -1.377*** FVA3 -0.000 0.001* 0.002 0.006 
(1.78) (-5.51) (-0.87) (-2.87) (-0.04) (1.80) (0.18) (1.63) 
AuditQ -3.013*** 1.535 -2.664* 0.634 AuditQ 0.037 -0.007 0.037 -0.022 
(-2.66) (0.86) (-1.74) (0.20) (0.62) (-0.43) (0.80) (-0.80) 
FVA12*AuditQ 0.075** -0.009 0.084* -0.013 FVA12*AuditQ 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(2.59) (-0.14) (1.85) (-0.17) (0.70) (0.04) (-0.15) (0.21) 
FVA3*AuditQ 2.026*** 0.364 1.795** 1.216* FVA3*AuditQ -0.055*** -0.003 -0.009 -0.011 
(5.07) (1.26) (2.03) (1.82) (-4.10) (-0.62) (-0.22) (-1.18) 
NFVA 0.594*** -0.023 0.597*** -0.009 LogPRICE -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.042*** -0.053*** 
(8.97) (-0.50) (9.31) (-0.22) (-3.14) (-5.85) (-3.14) (-6.03) 
NFVL -0.608*** 0.099** -0.612*** 0.085* LogTURN -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 
(-8.56) (2.08) (-8.89) (1.90) (-0.46) (3.59) (-0.46) (3.42) 
EPS 1.037*** 2.660*** 1.011*** 2.666*** LogRISK 0.449*** 0.393*** 0.449*** 0.393*** 
(5.12) (8.10) (5.02) (8.01) (35.74) (31.20) (35.85) (32.09) 
INSIDER% 0.000 -0.254* 0.000 -0.185 
(.) (-1.87) (.) (-1.46) 
INSTIT% 0.012 -0.008 0.015 -0.009 
(0.15) (-0.38) (0.19) (-0.50) 
Intercept 1.729*** -1.922 2.587*** -1.216 Intercept -0.248*** -0.205*** -0.264*** -0.197*** 
(2.96) (-0.93) (2.76) (-0.49) (-3.74) (-3.31) (-3.74) (-3.16) 
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Fixed Effect    Year    Year    Year    Year Fixed Effect    Year    Year    Year    Year 
N     631     581     631     581 N     617     614     617     614 
Adj-R2 0.67 0.74 0.67 0.74 Adj-R2 0.92 0.98 0.92 0.98 
F-tests, one-sided p-value  F-tests, one-sided p-value  
FVA3*AuditQ, small>large  0.000***  0.298  FVA3*AuditQ, small<large  0.000*** 0.481  
This table presents results examining whether audit quality effect of fair value estimates varies cross-sectionally with bank size. 
The partitioning size variable is bank’s total assets (AT). Small (Large) subsample includes banks with total assets that are among the 
bottom (top) quartile of the sample distribution of total assets within each fiscal year.  
Panel A presents results from regression in Equation (2) examining the effect of audit quality on the value relevance of fair value 
hierarchy (FVA12, FVA3) in Panel A, where the dependent variable is share price PRICE. Panel B presents results from regression in 
Equation (4) examining the effect of audit quality on the risk relevance of fair value hierarchy (FVA12, FVA3), where the dependent 
variable is bid-ask spread LogSPREAD. 
In each panel, Column 1 presents results when the audit quality measure (AuditQ) is Big 4 auditor, Big4, and Column 2 presents results 
when the audit quality measure is banking specialist auditor, Expert. Dummy variable Big4 equals to one if the bank is audited by one of 
the Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise. Expert is decile rank of the number of banks an auditor audited in a given year. 
Below the regressions, I present p-values from F-tests of coefficients testing whether audit quality of Level 3 fair value assets varies 
between small and large banks. 
The sample period is 2008-2013. 
The regressions are pooled OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Year 
fixed effects (untabulated) are included in all estimations. Continuous variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 6 
Cross-Sectional Analysis on Banks’ Capital Adequacy 
Panel A. Bank’s Capital Adequacy Effect on Equity Pricing Panel B. Bank’s Capital Adequacy Effect on Information Risk 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Declined NoDecline Declined NoDecline Variable Declined NoDecline Declined NoDecline 
FVA12 -0.011 0.128** 0.250** 0.102 FVA12 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.14) (2.04) (2.32) (1.54) (-0.20) (-0.80) (-0.34) (-0.40) 
FVA3 -0.598** 0.081 -0.753* -0.645** FVA3 0.006*** 0.001 0.006** -0.006 
(-2.39) (0.83) (-1.75) (-2.05) (3.19) (0.12) (2.26) (-0.67) 
AuditQ 3.339* 4.617*** 2.115 1.969 AuditQ 0.059*** 0.043** 0.094*** 0.069** 
(1.89) (4.82) (1.49) (1.24) (3.79) (2.55) (3.50) (2.39) 
FVA12*AuditQ 0.014 -0.029 0.040 0.103* FVA12*AuditQ -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.21) (-0.94) (0.71) (1.96) (-1.83) (-1.20) (-0.96) (-0.90) 
FVA3*AuditQ 0.944*** 0.339 1.306* 0.968* FVA3*AuditQ -0.016*** -0.006 -0.019*** 0.005 
(2.84) (0.72) (1.80) (1.77) (-4.02) (-0.92) (-2.67) (0.35) 
NFVA 0.051 0.076 0.248** 0.145*** LogPRICE 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.009 
(0.99) (1.31) (2.50) (2.73) (0.07) (0.94) (0.12) (1.04) 
NFVL -0.001 -0.031 -0.211** -0.105* LogTURN 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.01) (-0.49) (-1.99) (-1.82) (0.23) (-0.03) (0.56) (0.26) 
EPS 3.107*** 1.825*** 2.086*** 2.628*** LogRISK 0.442*** 0.444*** 0.442*** 0.443*** 
(4.43) (12.51) (10.09) (11.34) (47.36) (40.56) (47.65) (40.89) 
INSIDER% -0.270 0.227 -0.268 0.226 
(-1.60) (1.21) (-1.38) (1.16) 
INSTIT% 0.129*** 0.149*** 0.134*** 0.152*** 
(4.04) (4.94) (4.86) (5.22) 
Intercept 1.036 0.318 -0.099 -0.349 Intercept -0.214*** -0.287*** -0.240*** -0.308*** 
(0.46) (0.38) (-0.09) (-0.31) (-4.27) (-5.07) (-4.71) (-5.43) 
Fixed Effect    Year    Year    Year    Year Fixed Effect    Year    Year    Year     Year 
N     1,036     1,428     1,036     1,428 N     1,032     1,428    1,032     1,428 
Adj-R2 0.63 0.73 0.68 0.61 Adj-R2 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 
    
  
48
F-tests, one-sided p-value  F-tests, one-sided p-value  
FVA3*AuditQ, Decline>NoDecline 0.097* 0.339 FVA3*AuditQ, Decline<NoDecline 0.091* 0.072* 
This table presents results examining whether audit quality effect of fair value estimates varies cross-sectionally with bank’s capital 
adequacy. 
The partitioning variable is change in bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio (variable CAPR1 on Compustat) year on year. Declined (NoDecline) 
subsample includes banks with a negative (non-negative) change in bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio. 
Panel A presents results from regression in Equation (2) examining the effect of audit quality on the value relevance of fair value 
hierarchy (FVA12, FVA3) in Panel A, where the dependent variable is share price PRICE. Panel B presents results from regression in 
Equation (4) examining the effect of audit quality on the risk relevance of fair value hierarchy (FVA12, FVA3), where the dependent 
variable is bid-ask spread LogSPREAD. 
In each panel, Column 1 presents results when the audit quality measure (AuditQ) is Big 4 auditor, Big4, and Column 2 presents results 
when the audit quality measure is banking specialist auditor, Expert. Dummy variable Big4 equals to one if the bank is audited by one of 
the Big 4 auditors and zero otherwise. Expert is decile rank of the number of banks an auditor audited in a given year. 
Below the regressions, I present p-values from F-tests of coefficients testing whether audit quality of Level 3 fair value assets varies 
between banks with a declining regulatory capital and banks without a decline in regulatory capital. 
The sample period is 2008-2013. 
The regressions are pooled OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Year 
fixed effects (untabulated) are included in all estimations. Continuous variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 7 
Controlling for Auditor-Choice Self-Selection Adjustment 
Panel A. The Determinants of Big4 Auditor Choice 
Dependent Variable: Big4 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. 
Size 0.858*** 26.30 
Asset Structure 1.502 1.56 
Leverage 1.052*** 2.70 
Profitability 7.699*** 3.80 
Growth -0.583*** -2.87 
NewFinance 0.329** 2.41 
Intercept -7.182*** -28.32 
N 2,612 
Pseudo-R2 0.40 
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Panel B. Effect of Audit Quality on the Value- and Risk- Relevance of Fair Value Assets After Auditor-Choice Self-Selection 
Adjustment 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert  (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. 
FVA 0.196*** (3.56) 0.187*** (3.62) FVA -0.000*** (-3.87) -0.000*** (-2.78) 
AuditQ 0.369 (0.46) 0.079 (0.06) AuditQ -0.000 (-0.02) 0.056*** (2.79) 
FVA*AuditQ 0.041** (2.09) 0.066 (1.42) FVA*AuditQ -0.001*** (-4.17) -0.001*** (-4.23) 
NFVA 0.197*** (3.34) 0.198*** (3.19) LogPRICE -0.027*** (-3.68) -0.025*** (-3.44) 
NFVL -0.166*** (-2.60) -0.168** (-2.50) LogTURN -0.000*** (-6.77) -0.000*** (-6.58) 
EPS 2.068*** (12.71) 2.069*** (12.82) LogRISK 0.428*** (59.07) 0.429*** (59.25) 
      INSIDER% -0.108 (-0.74) -0.160 (-1.05) 
    INSTIT% 0.038 (1.44) 0.027 (1.02) 
IMR_Big4 -2.323*** (-6.01) -2.709*** (-8.15) IMR_Big4 -0.116*** (-10.07) -0.105*** (-9.49) 
Intercept 4.912*** (5.46) 5.291*** (4.93) Intercept -0.068 (-1.63) -0.099** (-2.30) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Fixed Effect Year Year 
N 2,461 2,461 N 2,457 2,457 
Adj-R2                    0.72 0.71 Adj-R2                     0.91                   0.91 
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 Panel C. Effect of Audit Quality on the Value- and Risk- Relevance of Fair Value Hierarchy of FAS 157 After Auditor-Choice 
Self-Selection Adjustment 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. 
FVA12 -0.007 (-0.16) 0.039 (1.13) FVA12 -0.000* (-1.72) -0.000 (-1.45) 
FVA3 -0.389** (-2.14) -0.484 (-1.64) FVA3 0.002 (1.35) 0.002 (0.86) 
AuditQ -0.196 (-0.18) -1.851 (-1.16) AuditQ -0.019 (-1.41) 0.027 (1.29) 
FVA12*AuditQ 0.059** (2.26) 0.121** (2.49) FVA12*AuditQ -0.000 (-0.15) 0.000 (0.10) 
FVA3*AuditQ 0.657* (1.91) 1.233** (2.18) FVA3*AuditQ -0.013*** (-3.42) -0.015** (-2.35) 
NFVA 0.078** (2.09) 0.161*** (3.92) LogPRICE -0.029*** (-3.98) -0.029*** (-4.00) 
NFVL -0.042 (-1.06) -0.130*** (-3.06) LogTURN -0.000*** (-6.29) -0.000*** (-7.53) 
EPS 2.533*** (13.82) 2.445*** (13.67) LogRISK 0.430*** (58.92) 0.430*** (59.02) 
INSIDER% -0.198 (-1.24) -0.199 (-1.15) 
INSTIT% 0.049* (1.75) 0.036 (1.31) 
IMR_Big4 -3.024*** (-6.33) -3.361*** (-8.13) IMR_Big4 -0.120*** (-10.76) -0.108*** (-10.15) 
Intercept 9.177*** (7.16) 9.704*** (7.20) Intercept -0.047 (-1.13) -0.071* (-1.71) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Fixed Effect Year Year 
N 2,464 2,464 N 2,457 2,457 
Adj-R2 0.64 0.65 Adj-R2 0.91 0.91 
F-tests, one-sided p-value  F-tests, one-sided p-value  
FVA3*AuditQ > FVA12*AuditQ 0.04** 0.03** 
FVA3*AuditQ < 
FVA12*AuditQ  0.000*** 0.000*** 
This table present results of sensitivity test after controlling for auditor selection bias using Heckman’s 2-stage approach. 
Panel A presents estimated coefficients of the following probit model estimates examining the factors responsible for bank’s choice of Big 
4 auditor: 
9/4=;
 + ;<! + ;==!#>#! + ;!?!#"/! + ;#.@"ABC + ;D#.Eℎ + ;!EG"G>! + & 
Size is natural log of total assets; AssetStructure is total inventory (Compustat items NPAORE and AHS) divided by total assets; Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt (Compustat items DLTT and DLC) divided by total assets; Profitability is net income (Compustat item IB) divided 
by total assets; Growth is total asset growth in the past year; and NewFinance is a dummy variable that equals to one if the sum of long-
term debt issuance and equity issuance (Compustat items DLTIS and SSTK) exceeds MK% of total assets.  
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Results of the probit model provides estimates to derive inverse Mills ratio (IMR_Big8), which is then used to control for bank’s non-
random selection of Big R auditors in Panel B and Panel C. 
Panel B and Panel C present results of Equation (J)-(R) with the addition of inverse Mills ratio (IMR_Big8), corresponding to Tables S and 
Table R, respectively. 
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
All other variables are as previously defined. 
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TABLE 8 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Panel A. Asset Size Matched Sample 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. 
FVA12 -0.034 (-0.80) 0.040 (1.16) FVA12 -0.000 (-1.02) -0.001** (-2.39) 
FVA3 -0.412* (-1.95) -0.470 (-1.62) FVA3 0.006*** (3.00) 0.006** (2.08) 
AuditQ 1.987** (2.10) 1.545 (0.88) AuditQ 0.053*** (3.33) 0.084*** (3.42) 
FVA12*AuditQ 0.080*** (2.81) 0.114** (2.05) FVA12*AuditQ -0.000 (-0.58) 0.000 (0.82) 
FVA3*AuditQ 0.752** (2.12) 1.522*** (2.75) FVA3*AuditQ -0.015*** (-3.99) -0.018*** (-3.03) 
NFVA 0.078** (2.22) 0.163*** (3.68) LogPRICE 0.005 (0.58) 0.007 (0.85) 
NFVL -0.037 (-1.03) -0.130*** (-2.91) LogTURN -0.000 (-0.14) 0.000 (0.31) 
EPS 2.868*** (12.32) 2.866*** (10.87) LogRISK 0.441*** (48.62) 0.442*** (49.52) 
    INSIDER% -0.059 (-0.36) -0.070 (-0.38) 
    INSTIT% 0.130*** (4.33) 0.137*** (5.10) 
Intercept 3.683*** (4.18) 2.888** (2.51) Intercept -0.248*** (-5.20) -0.271*** (-5.60) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Fixed Effect Year Year 
N 1,818 1,818 N 1,762 1,762 
Adj-R2 0.64 0.62 Adj-R2 0.91 0.91 
F-tests, one-sided p-value  F-tests, one-sided p-value  
FVA3*AuditQ > FVA12*AuditQ          0.03** 0.007*** FVA3*AuditQ < FVA12*AuditQ          0.000*** 0.001*** 
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Panel B. Market Capitalization Size Matched Sample 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. 
FVA12 -0.008 (-0.21) 0.053* (1.73) FVA12 -0.000 (-1.06) -0.000 (-1.01) 
FVA3 -0.838*** (-2.74) -1.115*** (-2.95) FVA3 0.003* (1.84) 0.001 (0.35) 
AuditQ 0.043 (0.04) -0.607 (-0.31) AuditQ -0.003 (-0.19) 0.015 (0.59) 
FVA12*AuditQ 0.050 (1.61) 0.070 (1.05) FVA12*AuditQ -0.000 (-1.11) -0.000 (-0.40) 
FVA3*AuditQ 1.062*** (2.63) 2.285*** (4.05) FVA3*AuditQ -0.008** (-2.31) -0.007 (-1.26) 
NFVA 0.072** (2.48) 0.134*** (3.14) LogPRICE -0.013 (-1.54) -0.013 (-1.60) 
NFVL -0.028 (-0.96) -0.097** (-2.19) LogTURN -0.000 (-0.44) -0.000 (-0.88) 
EPS 3.130*** (11.68) 3.015*** (11.10) LogRISK 0.424*** (37.38) 0.424*** (37.69) 
INSIDER% 0.024 (0.17) 0.029 (0.22) 
INSTIT% 0.090*** (3.50) 0.078*** (3.31) 
Intercept 5.172*** (4.26) 4.794*** (2.84) Intercept -0.244*** (-4.07) -0.246*** (-4.01) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Fixed Effect Year Year 
N 1,472 1,472 N 1,428 1,428 
Adj-R2 0.65 0.65 Adj-R2 0.92 0.92 
F-tests, one-sided p-value  F-tests, one-sided p-value  
FVA3*AuditQ > FVA12*AuditQ          0.007*** 0.000*** FVA3*AuditQ < FVA12*AuditQ          0.012** 0.113 
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Panel C. Exclusion of Financial Crisis Period 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. 
FVA12 0.049 (0.99) 0.125* (1.85) FVA12 -0.000 (-0.33) -0.000 (-1.24) 
FVA3 -0.423 (-1.47) -0.784** (-2.20) FVA3 0.006*** (2.88) 0.006** (2.48) 
AuditQ 5.863*** (5.47) 2.503* (1.71) AuditQ 0.038** (2.41) 0.052* (1.96) 
FVA12*AuditQ -0.068** (-2.02) 0.052 (1.03) FVA12*AuditQ -0.000 (-1.10) 0.000 (0.25) 
FVA3*AuditQ 0.942** (2.09) 1.576** (2.41) FVA3*AuditQ -0.016*** (-3.53) -0.022*** (-2.83) 
NFVA 0.004 (0.08) 0.162*** (2.80) LogPRICE -0.019 (-2.42) -0.017** (-2.15) 
NFVL 0.056 (1.14) -0.110* (-1.77) LogTURN -0.000 (-1.06) -0.000 (-0.69) 
EPS 2.494*** (7.40) 2.826*** (9.46) LogRISK 0.421*** (44.20) 0.421*** (44.30) 
INSIDER% -0.297*** (-2.14) -0.258 (-1.61) 
INSTIT% 0.141*** (4.88) 0.142*** (5.37) 
Intercept 2.995*** (3.68) 2.579*** (2.69) Intercept -0.313*** (-5.24) -0.326*** (-5.35) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Fixed Effect Year Year 
N 1,609 1,609 N 1,032 1,032 
Adj-R2 0.73 0.66 Adj-R2 0.91 0.91 
F-tests, one-sided p-value  F-tests, one-sided p-value  
FVA3*AuditQ > FVA12*AuditQ          0.014** 0.011** FVA3*AuditQ < FVA12*AuditQ          0.000*** 0.003*** 
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Panel D. Control for Bank’s Systematic Risk 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. 
FVA12 -0.001 (-0.03) 0.050 (1.27) FVA12 -0.000 (-0.68) -0.000 (-0.80) 
FVA3 -0.353** (-2.02) -0.486 (-1.65) FVA3 0.004*** (2.72) 0.004* (1.76) 
AuditQ 2.585*** (2.73) 1.099 (0.68) AuditQ 0.049*** (3.79) 0.076*** (3.45) 
FVA12*AuditQ 0.055** (2.02) 0.121** (2.32) FVA12*AuditQ -0.000* (-1.67) -0.000 (-0.65) 
FVA3*AuditQ 0.723** (2.16) 1.499*** (2.72) FVA3*AuditQ -0.014*** (-4.00) -0.015*** (-2.87) 
NFVA 0.083** (2.10) 0.176*** (3.85) LogPRICE 0.001 (0.20) 0.002 (0.26) 
NFVL -0.046 (-1.09) -0.143*** (-3.00) LogTURN -0.000 (-0.06) 0.000 (0.23) 
EPS 2.660*** (13.28) 2.621*** (13.04) LogRISK 0.437*** (57.50) 0.437*** (58.12) 
INSIDER% -0.008 (-0.05) 0.010 (0.06) 
INSTIT% 0.129*** (5.08) 0.133*** (5.84) 
Beta 0.430*** (2.81) 0.540*** (3.57) Beta 0.024*** (7.14) 0.024*** (7.11) 
Intercept 3.552*** (4.25) 2.693*** (2.61) Intercept -0.297*** (-7.47) -0.319*** (-7.97) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Fixed Effect Year Year 
N 2,464 2,464 N 2,460 2,460 
Adj-R2 0.63 0.62 Adj-R2 0.91 0.91 
F-tests, one-sided p-value  F-tests, one-sided p-value  
FVA3*AuditQ > FVA12*AuditQ          0.026** 0.008*** FVA3*AuditQ < FVA12*AuditQ          0.000*** 0.003*** 
This table presents results from sensitivity analyses examining the effect of audit quality of fair value hierarchy (H2) using a asset size 
matched sample, a market capitalization size matched sample, a sample after excluding financial crisis period (2008-2009), and after 
controlling for bank’s systematic risk. 
The asset size matched sample is obtained by matching a Big 4 audited bank with a non-Big 4 audited bank with the closest total assets in 
the same fiscal year. The market capitalization size matched sample is obtained by matching a Big 4 audited bank with a non-Big 4 
audited bank with the closest market capitalization (PRICE*CSHO) in the same fiscal year. The sample after excluding financial crisis 
period is obtained by dropping bank-year observations in fiscal year 2008 and 2009. 
A bank’s systematic risk (Beta) is estimated from a regression of bank-specific monthly returns regressed on the monthly value-weighted 
market returns for the period from three months after the prior fiscal year end to three months after the current fiscal year end. 
The sample period is 2008-2013 in Panel A, B and D; and 2010-2013 in Panel C. 
Below the regressions, I present p-values from F-tests of coefficients testing H2a and H2b. 
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The regressions are pooled OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Year 
fixed effects (untabulated) are included in all estimations. Continuous variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
All other variables are as previously defined. 
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TABLE 9 
Effect of Audit Quality on the Probability of Receiving a Comment Letter 
Dependent Variable: Comment_Letter 
Variable Pred sign (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
AuditQ - -0.206 -0.710* 
  
(-0.91) (-1.93) 
Restate + 0.053 0.071 
  
(0.19) (0.25) 
HighVolatility  + 0.238 0.208 
  
(1.10) (0.95) 
lnMarketCap  + 0.480*** 0.475*** 
(8.86) (11.09) 
Loss  + 0.282 0.275 
(1.45) (1.42) 
ExtFinancing  - 1.061 1.113 
(0.40) (0.43) 
    
Intercept -4.070*** -3.727*** 
(-12.65) (-12.08) 
Fixed Effect 
 
                        Year                        Year 
N                         1,549                         1,549 
Pseudo-R2   0.16 0.16 
This table presents results investigating whether banks audited by high-quality auditors are less 
likely to receive fair value related SEC comment letters from the following logit model: 
.HH!G_!!#=;
 + ; + ;!="! + ;J/ℎ.B"BC +
;GK"#L!"M + ;.== + ;NG"G>! + & 
Comment_Letter is a dummy variable that equals to one if bank i receives a fair value related 
comment letter in year t; 
Restate is a dummy variable that equals to one if bank i’s 10-K filing was restated in any of year 
t, t-1,or t-2; HighVolatility is a dummy variable that equals to one if the volatility of market-
adjusted monthly stock returns (CRSP items: RET-VWRET) is in the highest quartile, return 
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns in year t; LnMarketCap 
is the natural log of bank i’s market capitalization in year t; Loss is a dummy variable that equals 
to one if net income (Compustat item IB) is negative in any of year t, t-1,or t-2; and ExtFinance is 
the sum of equity financing (Compustat items SSTK-PRSTKC-DV) and debt financing 
(Compustat items DLTIS-DLTR-DLCCH) divided by total assets, measured in year t-1. 
Year fixed effects (untabulated) are included in all estimations.  
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests.  
All other variables are as previously defined. 
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TABLE 10 
Effect of Fourth Quarter Auditing versus Interim Quarters Reviewing 
Dependent Variable: PRICE Dependent Variable: LogSPREAD 
(1) Big4 (2) Expert  (1) Big4 (2) Expert 
Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. Variable Coeff. t-stats. Coeff. t-stats. 
FVA 0.168*** (3.79) 0.183*** (4.35) FVA 0.000 (0.78) 0.000 (0.15) 
AuditQ 3.569*** (8.30) 4.747** (2.38) AuditQ -0.047* (-1.87) -0.042 (-1.04) 
FVA*AuditQ 0.030 (1.44) 0.016 (0.39) FVA*AuditQ 0.000 (0.59) 0.001 (1.24) 
NFVA 0.154*** (3.83) 0.153*** (3.62) LogPRICE -0.202*** (-19.51) -0.204*** (-19.23) 
NFVL -0.111** (-2.41) -0.109** (-2.20) LogTURN 0.179*** (22.61) 0.175*** (22.72) 
EPS 5.339*** (10.22) 5.444*** (9.84) LogRISK 0.102*** (24.67) 0.103*** (24.94) 
     INSIDER% 0.087 (0.38) 0.050 (0.22) 
  INSTIT% -0.188*** (-4.97) -0.201*** (-5.30) 
Q4 1.153*** (4.99) 1.824*** (4.58) Q4 -0.020 (-1.48) -0.011 (-0.45) 
Q4*AuditQ -0.917 (-1.50) -1.842** (-2.07) Q4*AuditQ -0.002 (-0.09) 0.000 (0.00) 
Q4*FVA -0.006 (-0.90) -0.028*** (-3.16) Q4*FVA 0.001 (1.44) -0.000 (-0.10) 
Q4*AuditQ*FVA 0.013 (1.03) 0.049*** (3.55) Q4*AuditQ*FVA -0.000 (-0.97) 0.000 (0.26) 
Intercept 3.187*** (5.37) 1.379 (1.54) Intercept -0.524*** (-8.81) -0.539*** (-9.00) 
Fixed Effect Year Year Fixed Effect Year Year 
N 10,209 10,209 N 7,672 7,672 
Adj-R2                    0.64 0.63 Adj-R2                     0.65                   0.65 
This table presents results investigating analysis using quarterly data to examine whether the audit quality effect on pricing of banks’ fair 
value measurements are stronger in the fourth quarter than in the interim quarters. 
Q4 is a dummy variable equals to one for the fourth quarters. 
The three-way interaction term (Q4*AuditQ*FVA) captures the incremental effect of the fourth quarter auditing, relative to interim 
quarters reviewing. 
The regressions are pooled OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Year 
fixed effects (untabulated) are included in all estimations. Continuous variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
*, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
All other variables are as previously defined, but measured on a quarterly basis. 
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